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Abstract While on the surface the Turkish state appears to have asymmetrical power vis-
a`-vis downstreamers and local societal opponents, and therefore, the ability to shape basin
politics, domestic, basin and international protest over the ‘securitised’ Ilısu Dam in
Turkey proved more decisive in that respect. A cornerstone of the GAP (Gu¨neydog˘u
Anadolu Projesi, Southeast Anatolia Project) multi-dam project to harness the water from
the Euphrates and Tigris, the dam project elicited successful resistance from Turkey’s
downstream neighbours, social and environmental NGOs and professionals targeting the
international donors and contractors. On the basis of document research and interviews,
this article investigates which factors opened up the space for politicising the project, and
how this politicisation played out in both the domestic and international domain. The link
between the securitised (where water is almost by default a security issue) and non-
securitised spheres of hydropolitical decision-making (where it is not) proved crucial to the
success of the anti-dam opposition.
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Although the Euphrates–Tigris basin1 has frequently been presented as a prime candidate
for ‘water wars’ (Starr and Stoll 1988; Bulloch and Darwish 1993), an international war
over this scarce resource has yet to happen. Dam building on these rivers, however, has
been the focus of domestic strife, interstate threats and international campaigning. The
Turkish GAP (Gu¨neydog˘u Anadolu Projesi) multi-dam project has become politicised right
from the start. Since 1984, a sequence of dams for irrigation and hydroelectricity has been
built on the Euphrates (Firat) River over both neighbours’ objections and radical Kurdish
attacks. At the turn of the century, the construction of the Ilısu Dam, the most expensive so
far and the first on the Tigris (Dicle), seems to constitute a break in the pattern. The
flooding of villages to make room for Ilısu’s reservoir, including the historically important
town of Hasankeyf, exposed the projected dam to resistance from a coalition of local, basin
and international non-governmental organisation (INGO) groups who managed to stop the
flow of external funding of the dam in 2001/2002.
International NGO protest can influence the basin’s balance of power, adding weight to
downstream resistance to upstream dam construction. Yet, connecting the domestic and
international politicisation of the GAP, notably the Ilısu Dam on the Tigris, shows the
contradictions of NGO activism affecting the political process just as relations between the
basin states were improving. It is argued that privatisation of the water sector increased
Turkey’s permeability to the values of the ‘non-security’ world, whose audience’s
acceptance of Turkey’s ‘securitising moves’ (Buzan et al. 1998) was not greater than those
of NGO ‘countersecuritising moves’. It is shown that securitisation strategies of various
actors, not just state actors, affected and continue to affect the basin’s politics. The article
moreover highlights an underexposed divergence of the security discourse and dynamics in
the regional ‘hydropolitical complex’ from that played out in the international arena.
The underlying conceptual framework will be explained in Sect. 2. To shed light on the
context of the dispute, Sect. 3 sketches a brief hydropolitical history of Turkey’s dam
development. After that, Sect. 4 charts domestic and international struggles over river
projects, zooming in on the controversy over the Ilısu Dam. Specifically, it asks what
opened up the possibility to politicise the Ilısu Dam and its flooding, and how successful it
was on the Turkish domestic and international scene. The article ends with a discussion on
the securitisation and conclusion (Sect. 5).
The analysis is based on document research and informed by six semi-structured
interviews with policymakers and stakeholder representatives carried out during a visit to
the GAP area in May 2010.
2 Conceptual framework: securitisation, desecuritisation and countersecuritisation
According to a constructivist perspective of ‘security’, the values security embodies and
the dangers that threaten it are not a reality ‘out there’, but constructed problems. Drawing
on linguistic pragmatism (Austin 1962), which claims words can create social facts, Buzan
et al. (1998) have noted the singular political effect of identifying policy problems as
security issues. Presenting an issue as a security issue is a potent way of rallying a political
constituency behind a policy. Vital threats such as war and terrorism can be leveraged as
reasons for pushing normal rights and rules to one side. ‘Security’ successfully presents a
1 On the pitfalls of conflating the Euphrates and Tigris into one system, see (Harris and Alatout 2010).
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threat as a life-and-death concern (‘securitisation’), legitimising extraordinary measures. In
so doing, security speech can change the arena.
Ullmann (1983) noted that traditional low-politics issues such as economics, energy and
the environment can become linked with national security issues (high politics). In this
context, domestic actors may actively link water issues to high-politics concerns. While it
is often northern countries that frame transboundary issues as security concerns, Leboeuf
and Broughton (2008) argue that water-poor states have done likewise. The Euphrates and
Tigris riparians have likewise resorted to the elevation of water to national security as a
consequence of issue linkage with a view to widening or narrowing the power gap between
the hydro-hegemon and non-hegemons (Zeitoun and Warner 2006).
The 1990s have seen a debate on the merits of securitisation. Securitisation legitimises
extraordinary public measures (top-down decision-making, classifying information,
bypassing normal standards of participation and economic valuation) that may benefit the
environment but also be environmentally counterproductive. Newman (2009) suggests that
the securitised status of an issue fosters environmental degradation more than it otherwise
would, but warns that de-securitised (joint) development projects set up in the name of
peace can also damage the environment. Fox and Sneddon (2007) likewise picture envi-
ronmental securitisation2 at right angles to environmental/ecological security: jealously
guarding state sovereignty ultimately precipitates environmental crises that undermine that
sovereignty. To prevent this, they claim that a governance framework is required in which
state and non-state actors are roughly equal partners. A transboundary basin could be a
‘new political space’ (Fox and Sneddon 2007: 257).
To understand the relation between transboundary basin politics and security concerns,
Schulz (1995) identified Turkey, Syria and Iraq as a hydro-political security complex
(HSCs). ‘Security complexes are analytical entities consisting of units displaying distinct
patterns of both amity and enmity… surrounded by a zone of relative indifference’ (Buzan
1991). In such a complex, ‘major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both, are
so interlinked that their major security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved
apart from one another’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 201; Buzan and Wæver 2011: 37). Next to
horizontal relations to other HSCs such as Israeli-Palestine, Schulz identified vertical state
links to the overlay of global hegemonic games. The present contribution argues that
important vertical ties are also traceable to domestic issues.
Securitisation can be a desirable strategy for an impatient policymaker. Given the
potency of this effect, it can be tempting to extend the state of exception indefinitely, as has
been the case in Egypt since 1980 until it was lifted late January 2012, or to instrumentalise
security speech to attain ulterior goals: legitimacy, compliance, control over freedoms,
resources and political standing within the bureaucracy. The risk of power abuse has
incited Buzan et al. (1998) to favour ‘desecuritisation’: a reframing of issues away from the
security domain, into that of normal politics by undermining the ‘felicity’ of the security
logic with the intended audience. After all, the success of a security discourse coalition,
whether for or against a project, depends on the context and the audience (Balzacq 2005). It
takes a receptive audience to validate and ‘instantiate’ a securitising move or alternatively
contest the vital threat. The prior relationship between speaker and audience informs the
way the audience will respond to the security discourse. The audiences reached (whether
intentionally or unintentionally) may be multiple and may include stakeholders outside the
securitised territory, who need to be convinced of the exceptionality of the survival issue.
2 Fox and Sneddon (2007: 239) define environmental securitization as a ‘state-based endeavour to protect
access to and control over resources falling within territorial boundaries’.
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While Buzan et al. (1998) originally stated that securitisation has to come from a
position of authority, this view was soon contested: Litfin (1999) and others convincingly
claimed that basically everyone can ‘do security’; even from an ‘abject position’, the
security have-nots can re-appropriate it for other purposes (Aradau 2004). NGOs and
community-based organisations may break normal rules to protect their communities
against perceived threats. Thus, others in the policy domain may securitise another value
than the original securitising actor identified, in so doing ‘breaking the spell’ of the original
securitisation. Such an action may be labelled a ‘countersecuritising move’ (Warner 2011).
Table 1 shows in ten easy steps how to securitise and contersecuritisate.
It is argued that these (counter)securitising moves have played a key role in the con-
troversy over Turkish dams on transboundary rivers—not only on behalf of their initiators,
to promote the scheme’s acceptance, but also their domestic and foreign opponents. While
influential Turkish voices have appropriated the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as Turkish
water for Turkish development and security, with the Turkish state as its legitimate
manager (Harris and Alatout 2010), both internal and external opponents have contested
this claim. To contextualise this, the background of Turkish dam development is consid-
ered next (Table 1).
3 Politicisation and securitisation of the GAP project
3.1 The run-up to GAP
In 1920 the defeated Turkish Sultan Mehmet VI signed the Treaty of Sevres, which
lobotomised the Ottoman Empire, a major force since the twelfth century. The Sultan’s
abdication in November 1922 established a secular, Europe-oriented republic with a strong
role for the military. The new government managed to negotiate a better deal for Turkey in
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923: the minorities were not to gain independence, and interna-
tional control was rescinded.
Post-Ottoman Turkey continued to manifest itself as a regional player. It is historically
very well placed at the crossroads between Southeast Europe, the Middle East and Central
Asia. Turkey has been a long-time member and cornerstone of NATO and was one of the
top three recipients of American foreign aid until the war against Iraq in 2003.
Table 1 Securitisation and countersecuritisation in ten easy steps (Warner 2011, after Buzan et al. 1998)
How to securitise or countersecuritise in ten easy steps
1. Select an issue that is sufficiently complex and uncertain
2. Identify or invent a crisis (injustice) to be overcome
3. Present the particular view as the general interest
4. Attribute the problem to an ‘other’
5. Present the issue as urgent and solvable
6. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the hero of the story
7. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the victim of the story (e.g. in need of saving)
8. Mobilise the support of key audiences, including the help of a powerful donor
9. Put word into action, if necessary placing yourself above the law
10. If attention flags, bring in a new threat that warrants the same solution
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Turkey’s development trajectory was state-led and authoritarian. In the 1930s, Atatu¨rk,
father of the Republic, envisaged diverting the Euphrates and Tigris to the drier west of
Turkey. This plan gave way to a development vision for the Southeast modelled on the
Dniepr development plan in the Soviet Union (Mukhtarov 2009). First studies were con-
ducted in the 1960s, leading to concrete river development proposals in 1970.
In the 1970s, the trade balance of all three Euphrates–Tigris riparians tilted from net
food exports to net food imports. An aspiration for autarky spurred Turkey’s internal
regulation and resource drive: large irrigation schemes could turn the Southeast into a
‘breadbasket’ for the Middle East. Southeast Anatolia is dry (rainfall ranges between 470
and 830 mm) but rich in fertile soils. Irrigation enables the production of summer crops
(cotton, maize, sesame, soybean) which so far was impossible in Southeast Anatolia. In all,
the irrigation schemes are scheduled to develop a 2-million-hectare area, an area the
collective size of the Benelux countries. The Euphrates is not particularly rich in fish, but
this sector is also promoted, especially in the Atatu¨rk Dam reservoir.
At the same time, Turkey’s energy import bill skyrocketed due to OPEC’s energy price
hike while domestic demand was on the increase. Annual hydroelectricity production from
GAP will produce 22 per cent of Turkey’s total energy generation with an installed
capacity of 7,476 MW. The Ilısu HEPP project discussed below is a milestone in this
hydroelectric ambition.
After evaluating 22 different combinations of four dams of different heights, the
Turkish State Hydraulic Works department, Devlet Su Is¸leri (DSI), presented the Lower
Firat plan for the Euphrates in 1970 to bring irrigation and low-cost energy to the sur-
rounding plains between what are now the Keban and Atatu¨rk dams. In 1977, the Lower
Firat plan was integrated into a package with all other schemes in these regions, seven
hydropower and irrigation schemes on the Euphrates and 6 on the Tigris, by the name of
GAP. In 1983 construction of the project’s centrepiece, the Atatu¨rk Dam, started.
Given the large outlay and uncertainties involved, a Turkish-Japanese consortium was
commissioned to draw up a GAP Master Plan, which recommended scaling back the GAP
to priority projects (Brismar 2002) but continued its radical reorientation towards a
regional development project, people-focussed rather than water oriented in scope. The
Master Plan sought to lift the region, seen as backward, in terms of education, agricultural
practices, gender relations, environmental conditions and participation. By then the GAP
scheme had expanded to 22 dam projects (comprising 80 dams) and 19 hydropower
schemes involving 66 hydropower stations on both the Euphrates and Tigris,3 providing
irrigation for 1.9 million ha and investment in health, education, finance and transportation
to modernise a traditional agricultural society in a region twice the size of Belgium (Balat
2003).
Despite its progressive reincarnation, the scheme kept inciting domestic and interna-
tional allegations that the project was neither sustainable nor peaceful. Downstream states
complained about the quantitative and qualitative impacts on their water resources, actors
in the Kurdish-inhabited region where the dams are planned saw it as a hostile move to
integrate the Kurds into Turkey, while (I)NGOs activist academics and journalists worried
about the humanitarian, environmental and cultural heritage consequences of flooding
dozens of villages.
3 Not all of these dams are in fact on the Euphrates or Tigris themselves: eight dams are planned under GAP
in the valley of the River Munzur in Tunceli and three more on the Greater Zap in Hakkari province.
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3.2 Downstream fear of floods and droughts
The Turkish state’s hydraulic mission not only impacts on the country’s relations with the
Southeast, but also the state of play with downstream neighbours. Both the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers have great extremes between their highest and lowest flow levels, bringing
risk of both drought and floods. The region is also drought-prone, inviting impoundment of
water in dams. Downstream states are normally the first to shield themselves from flooding
and develop the flatter valley lands, and Iraq is no exception. Flood control can bring many
benefits: regulated water supply, agrarian and industrial development and control of ter-
ritory. Especially in Iraq, floods have historically brought distress and inspired Great Flood
accounts like Gilgamesh as well as the biblical deluge recounted in the book of Genesis.
This especially concerns the river Tigris: snowmelt from the Taurus and, via its Zap
tributaries, Zagros Mountains add their waters causing often destructive flooding. In
ancient Mesopotamia, the spring floods were a source of acute fear each year; in recent
times, the 1954 flood ravaged the capital, Baghdad. In response, Iraq built the ar-Ramadi
and Sa¯marra¯’ barrages in the 1950s, to divert the floodwaters into Lake Habbaniyah and the
Tharthar depression in central Iraq. Even larger works carried out on the Tigris tributaries
Zap and Diyala further tamed the Tigris, though the last major Tigris flood is as recent as
1988.
When midstream Syria started developing the Euphrates, Syria and Iraq just stopped
short of a violent clash over water in 1976. The Cold War provided an opportunity for
Syria to build its Tabqa Dam between 1966 and 1973 with Soviet support. This reduced the
flood risk for Iraq, but also curtailed much-needed irrigation water and silt (and, less
welcome, salt). Iraq claimed that the dam’s impoundment adversely affected 3 million
Iraqi farmers (Starr and Stoll 1988). As a result, in 1975, armed forces of both countries
were mobilised at the border. The Arab League had to mediate.
Ever since Syria and Iraq’s wings of the ruling Ba’ath (‘Renaissance’) party split,
relations between the two countries have been notoriously bad, and the 1975 clash was the
closest the Euphrates riparians have come to violence over water. However, a common
cause against a third party can make enemies temporarily set aside their differences and
create a joint front. The GAP mega-project provided the occasion for their joining forces
and delivering fierce protests and threat to Turkey each time a dam is announced.
Any upstream latecomer inevitably faces a legitimacy problem as downstreamers will
claim prior use (Kibarog˘lu 2003). The historic Euphrates flow before Turkey started its
project is calculated at 1,000 cubic metres per second (m3/s) at the border with Syria. The
downstream Arab states argue that since there are three states sharing the river’s flow, each
is entitled to one-third, giving the two Arab states a total of around 667 m3/s (Gruen 2004).
Turkey could not agree to that amount, but signed a protocol with Syria in 1987 promising
to release an average of 500 m3/s, about half the river flow, across the Turkish–Syrian
border, and has not flagrantly defaulted.
Frequently, a GAP-induced 40 per cent reduction in river discharge downstream is
predicted for Syria and up to 80 per cent less for Iraq; this latter figure would be a
cumulative effect of Turkish and Syrian dam projects (Shapland 1997). But more important
than the real impact is the potential to give the water tap a twist in either direction. After all
Turkish engineers stopped the Euphrates flow for a month to fill the storage lake for the
huge Atatu¨rk Dam, in a year where the flow was low anyway (190 m3/s). The Turks
declared the decision final and non-negotiable (Zawahri 2008). The two downstreamers
pleaded for dam-lake impoundment without stopping the river, but in 1990 President O¨zal
claimed that the Euphrates–Tigris does not have to be shared because it is a ‘Turkish river’.
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This way, Turkey resisted internationalisation of the water issue, claiming that the water is
safest in Turkish hands. Turkey did honour its obligation to supplement the flow later. The
Birecik dam, also on the Euphrates, was filled in another dry period, 1999 until 2001.
When 2000 carried an extremely low flow of 75 m3/s, Turkey made endeavours to let
through 400 m3 (Brismar 2002).
Active storage in Syrian dams would be too small to contain strategic or unintentional
mass releases or mass ‘arrests’ of the Euphrates and Tigris. The Turks, however, are
investing great effort into trying to convince others that its actions are taken in good faith
and serve the interests of the downstream actors as well. The Tigris is more flood prone
than the Euphrates—snowmelt in March can cause torrential flooding in April, the harvest
month, which necessitated early diking, canalisation and diversion works in Iraq.4 The
Turkish dams regulate the hydrological regime, so that they not only cushion the impact of
floods and droughts downstream but also improve the timing of the river regime to
coincide with downstream agricultural needs (Bilen 2000). Turkey, thus, contributes to a
stability of expectations that can be regarded as an international public good—but without
conferring with its neighbours.
So far, Turkey has laid relatively limited claim to the Tigris, but the final series of GAP
dams will significantly enclose that river, too. The first big dam on the Tigris, Ilısu,
1,810 m long and 135 m high, will have a total storage capacity of just under 10.5 billion
cubic metres and an operating capacity of 7.5 billion m3. Normally, that would leave a
buffer capacity of 3 billion m3. As the average annual inflow of the Tigris is 15 billion m3,
the reservoir will account for half the total annual Tigris flow. Opponents fear that the
spare capacity would enable a malevolent Turkish government to arrest the river influx for
some additional months, such that, they hold, not a drop of Tigris water would flow into
Syria and Iraq (Bosshard 1999).
Not just closing but also suddenly opening the floodgates would be disastrous. There is a
historic precedent: in 689 B.C. Sennacherib, the Assyrian dammed the Euphrates upstream
from Baghdad, only to destroy it after sufficient water had assembled behind the dam. The
sudden flood wave flooded the Mesopotamian capital and won Sennacherib the day.
According to a Pentagon statement, Iraq itself used strategic flooding of the Tigris to stop
Iranian advances in the 1980s, and indeed, there were fears that the river would be used as
a defence against the allied invasion in 2003 (CNN 2003). A dam can even break acci-
dentally: half a million citizens in Mosul and Baghdad found themselves at risk from a
flood wave if a fragile Iraqi dam should break at Mosul (Independent, 8 August 2007).
When Syria joined the anti-Saddam coalition in the Gulf War, the two countries offi-
cially fell out, but after a 5-day meeting in 1996, the states decided jointly to dispatch
threatening letters to companies involved in building the Birecik dam. When the Ilısu Dam,
a hydropower and irrigation project 45 km from the Syrian border, and its smaller sister
dam, Cizre, were mooted, Syria and Iraq again joined forces sending protest letters to
funders. Turkey’s upstream development caused the downstream riparians to be suffi-
ciently ‘realist’ to agree in 1996 on a percentage distribution of whatever Turkey leaves
them: 42 per cent for Syria and 58 per cent for Iraq.
Until 2008 the downstream riparians have consistently resisted the building of new
Turkish dams and maintained the Euphrates and Tigris are international rivers. Iraq and
Syria furthermore claim a breach of international law and riparian water rights. This is not
a particularly strong hand, though. With some imagination, a breach of a Turco-Syrian
treaty stipulating consultation between riparians could be invoked. The Treaty of
4 http://www.livius.org/men-mh/mesopotamia/tigris.html.
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Friendship and Good Neighbourliness signed in 1946 by Iraq and Turkey was the first real
legal instrument for cooperation. It included a Protocol for the Control of the Waters of the
Tigris and Euphrates, and their tributaries. The countries agreed that flood control struc-
tures and storage services should be built upstream on Turkish territory, which was the
most effective location. The Turks promised to provide daily hydrological and meteoro-
logical data concerning floods (Gruen 2000). A Turkish–Iraqi Protocol signed that same
year allowed Iraq to construct hydrological infrastructure and meteorological stations
along the rivers inside Turkey ‘to prevent downriver flooding and, thus, benefit Iraq’ (El-
Fadel et al. 2002). But international law only provides only cold comfort for water
plaintiffs: there are no widely shared and enforced principles governing international
rivers. Iraq may insist on the international law doctrine of absolute territorial integrity,
stipulating that no riparian is allowed to impair the quality and quantity of the water
resources flowing within its territory. But Turkey can with equal vigour juxtapose the
doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty, also known as the Harmon doctrine: each state
can treat the water within its boundaries any which way it likes.5
3.3 Linkage politics and the Kurdish issue
Although Turkish and Arabic groups are also significant in the GAP region, Kurds dom-
inate. Southeast Anatolia is a patchwork quilt of landowners and landless, often groups of
nomadic origin which various Ottoman rulers tried to sedentarise with varying success
since the seventeenth century. When the dream of independence fell through in the 1920s,
the Kurds resisted ‘horizontal integration’ by an assimilative Kemalist republic, staging
several uprisings. The republic, in turn, regarded their particularism, but also their aversion
to secularism as a threat to Turkish unity. The Turkish Republic was defined as an indi-
visible, unitary Turkish state in which the Kurds formally existed only as ‘mountain’ or
‘Eastern Turks’ (dog˘ulu). This key plank of the Kemalist scaffolding was enforced in a
(recently relaxed) curb on Kurdish identity, language and culture, seeking the cultural
homogenisation (Turkification) of an imagined ‘Kurdistan’.
When the resolutely secular Kurdish Workers’ Party arrived on the scene claiming to
represent the Kurdish cause in the early 1980s, they did not command an obvious fol-
lowing, but in Leninist fashion, the PKK regarded itself as the uncompromising front
guard. In 1984, as construction works for the Atatu¨rk Dam got underway, the PKK staged
violent attacks on the dam. Reportedly, 1,100 vehicles and pieces of working machinery
were destroyed (Williams 2003). While the PKK did not manage to stop construction,
slowing down development inevitably drove up the costs of the project.
Organised along tribal lines (Erhan 1997), Kurdish identity is by no means socially
cohesive or culturally unified. But the attacks gave a face to Kurdish aspirations for
autonomy. Kurdish parties in Turkish parliament were forced to the denounce PKK, or
close down if they did not. The uprising again sparked ruthless response from the Turkish
armed forces as well as paramilitary death squads. Both the Turkish Army and the PKK
intimidated the villages, the former to smoke out insurgents from villages and forests, the
latter to ensure allegiance to their cause.
From the early 1990s, GAP dams officially became an instrument in the ‘fight against
terrorism’. State officials argued that ‘terrorists will no longer be able to easily cross from
one region to the other due to the dams’. The dam site for Ilısu, for example, is near ‘Hell’s
5 Turkey (along with two other upstreamers, China and Burundi) decided not to sign the 1997 UN treaty on
non-navigable watercourses, claiming the treaty grants downstream states excessive rights.
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Valley’, famously named for its mountainous corridors used by Kurdish fighters. Oppo-
nents therefore claim that the dams seek to block easy passage between Kurdish from the
Iraqi and Syrian side; 5,000 Turkish soldiers were reportedly stationed at Ilısu for the
period of the construction works (O¨zok-Gu¨ndogan 2005).
Yet, President O¨zal saw the continuing war and securitisation of hydraulic development
as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional ambitions. In 1993 O¨zal, the PKK and other Kurdish
leaders seemed close to coming to an understanding along the lines of a federation, and the
PKK called a unilateral ceasefire to end the intifada (Jongerden and Oudshoorn 1997). But
after the President passed away, his successor Demirel chose to reinforce the violence
against insurgents.
The aspiration for statehood for the Kurdish, dispersed over several countries, makes it
an ideal issue for both Turkey and its neighbours to conduct linkage politics. From 1978,
Syria used the Kurdish in Syria as a bargaining chip to add force to its water demands. But
Turkey could use its upstream position as a bargaining chip, too. When Turkish threats to
stop water flows to Syria led to Syrian promises to discontinue their support to the PKK,
the resistance movement could use Lebanon’s Biqa’a Valley in Lebanon, then controlled
by Syria, as a training ground. In the mid-1990s, Turkey increased its minimum flow
pledge to Syria (Daoudy 2009), but Syria wanted more. By 1998, Turkish–Syrian relations
came to a head with threats of violence. Syria backed down and handed over O¨calan.
Relations with Iraq on the Kurdish issue show a more complex mix of cooperation and
conflict. Before the defeat of Saddam, a key worry for the Turkish state was Iraq’s
hegemonic aspirations, especially after his invasion of Kuwait (Aydın 2003). Turkey lent
logistic support to the allied invasion of Iraq in 1991 but occasionally needed its neighbour
to grant ‘hot pursuit’ of Kurdish separatists on Iraqi territory. Turkey also refused to block
Iraq’s river access despite allied requests to do so. It is perhaps indicative of changed basin
relations that Turkey no longer allowed its territory to be used as an air base in the 2003
war on Iraq.
3.4 New international players in basin politics
Until 1994 conflicts over the Euphrates and Tigris remained within a neat Realist frame-
work of rivalry between states. However, the privatisation in the Turkish water sector has
brought new actors into play from outside the securitised sphere, directly or indirectly
influencing basin politics: transnational companies (TNCs), and hot on their heels, INGOs
see Table 2 below. The latter’s campaign over human rights and cultural heritage in dam
site areas added to the opposition from co-riparians targeted the Achilles heel of a project
of this size and scale: funding (Table 2).
Finding external money for GAP has proved problematic for the Turkish government
from the start. Although the World Bank formally decided not to fund GAP projects in
1984, the Turkish government apparently never even formally applied for Bank backing,
sensing the Bank would show itself highly sensitive to protestations on the part of
co-riparians Syria and Iraq.
Table 2 Actors in controversy over the Turkish Ilısu Dam
Private TNCs: ABB, Balfour Beatty, Sulzer Hydro (VA Tech), Skanska, Impreglio
Public Riparian governments and donor governments insuring export (political) risk
Civil society NGOs and INGOs, academics, press
The struggle over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam
123
An inflation-ridden economy groaned under the development effort, coupled with the
cost of military engagement with the PKK. The lack of multilateral cooperation made itself
felt in ever more painful ways when in the early nineties projects started to fall behind
schedule and GAP began to look like the famed ‘white elephant’: the costly development
project that never materialises. The GAP, however, could gather steam due to a radical
institutional move: privatisation. As early as in 1987, the Izmit dam ran out of funds. Izmit,
located close to Turkey’s capital metropolis, Istanbul, was to provide water for homes and
industry. At the instigation of President O¨zal, a private consortium was created, Izmit Su,
to complete the works (dam, storage lake, sewage works and water utility). Thames Water
was contracted under a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme to run the utility for
15 years before returning it to the municipality of Izmit.
While private investment was possible under the 1984 Build-Operate-Transfer law, the
required legislative framework and infrastructure simply were not in place.6 A privatisation
law, opposed by the secular and religious right, was pushed through Parliament in
November 1994 by Prime Minister Ciller. As a result, the Izmit project was ready to go
onstream 10 years after its abortive start.
Faced with an acute shortage of project funds for the remainder of the GAP project,
Turkey needed to co-opt the global jet stream of liberalisation and privatisation in the
water sector. While Turkey needed to project a vision of GAP bringing mutual hydraulic
benefit to an international audience, if only to secure the flow of funds, privatisation
presaged a heated internationalised dispute over the Izmit, Birecik and, most intensely,
Ilısu Dam, the first major Turkish dam on the Tigris. Privatisation not only exposed donors
and guarantors to public scrutiny, it also ran up against activist (I)NGO strategy calling
foreign companies account for their corporate governance practice. Their conclusions were
supported by the Government Audit Department, Sayistay, in 1999–2000, who issued a
detailed report saying that, from beginning to end, ‘the project was full of violations of
laws’. In 2002, after the contract expired, the Turkish Court of Accounts found irregu-
larities in the contract that made the water too expensive (cited in Munir 2004).
For construction companies, the projects do not just provide opportunity but much-needed
economic security in a highly competitive market. However, participation in GAP also
carried considerable economic and political risk: investing in a controversial project in a
country that was effectively still at war with itself. As international companies were loath to
carry the risk themselves, the contractors sought to alleviate it by securing export credits from
the export credit agencies (ECAs) of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States and the UK in Summer 1998. Export credits were especially
needed to secure the participation of the British construction company Balfour Beatty,
approached by the Swiss-Swedish construction giant ABB (Asea Brown Boveri) to sub-
contract the civil engineering works while ABB itself took care of the electrical engineering.
Sulzer Escher Wyss would lead the construction consortium to realise the dam, the reservoir
and hydropower station. Other enterprises involved in the original Ilısu consortium were
Impreglio (Italy), Skanska (Sweden) and the Turkish companies Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen.
The international private involvement in Ilısu exposed the companies and their gov-
ernmental backers to angry Syrian letters and writs against foreign investors and con-
structors involved in GAP. Syria repeatedly claimed that Turkish interventions damaged
Syrian agriculture and water supply. When Ilısu was approved, Syria filed compensation
claims from constructing and funding companies, including Chase Manhattan Bank, and
threatened to blacklist them until a trilateral agreement was signed.
6 http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Dergi/D581997/birecik.html (Access ??).
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While such downstream resistance greets the start of any new Turkish dam project, the
guaranteeing governments had not counted on the GAP uniting Syria and Iraq (Gulf War
adversaries) and (I)NGOs in an alliance of convenience over human rights. This interna-
tional support for downstream protest was to become a factor in the hydropolitics of the
basin.
4 The battle over Ilısu
4.1 The flooding of Zeugma and Hasankeyf
As the funding for Ilısu Dam became a news item in Europe, the Bireck dam, just north of
the Syrian border, was also under fire. Started in April 1996 and completed in 2002, filling
its reservoir necessitated the flooding of the ancient Roman city of Zeugma in 2000.
Labelling Zeugma a ‘second Pompeii’, opponents not just saw this flooding as a tragedy for
local history but also for the world’s cultural heritage. The GAP administration (quoted in
Shoup 2006) played down the issue noting that the city centre and hundreds of historic
villas remain untouched: ‘Turkey has so many [historic] resources that a single one cannot
matter’ when the cradle of civilisation gives way to a new kind of civilisation. An
indignant editorial on the Birecik flooding in 1996 in the New York Times, however, was
reprinted in Turkey and triggered a petition from Turkish archaeologists and architects. A
mosaic was salvaged after a US$5 million donation from American billionaire David
Packard (Shoup 2006).7
For the Ilısu hydropower project, the lower reaches of the coastal town of Hasankeyf
will disappear. Eighty-one other heritage sites are similarly facing inundation, including
several Muslim and Christian holy sites that are still in use today. Said to be a late Assyrian
settlement dating back from the seventh century B.C. and a node of the Silk Road in the
Middle Ages, Hasankeyf occupied a strategic position as a fortified castle, controlling the
caravan route from Diyarbakir to Mosul in Iraq, and continues to attract pilgrims to the
tomb of Imam Abdullah. But because the whole region is so rich in historic architecture,
Hasankeyf did not command much special interest until a French historian published on it
in the 1940s (Meinecke 1996). In 1969, a study of Hasankeyf was made, and in 1978,
Turkey’s Culture Ministry pledged full archaeological protection. In 1981, the site was
listed among 22 declared first-class cultural heritage sites. The year before, however, in
1980, an international consortium had been commissioned to draw up a feasibility report
for the Ilısu hydroelectricity project and in 1982 the Ilısu Dam plan was ready, including
the submersion of Hasankeyf.
The mayor of Hasankeyf moved into a limestone cave in protest against their inunda-
tion, while journalists collected dramatic quotes such as ‘My family has been living here
for 450 years… they want to extinguish the culture of a 1,000 years for the sake of one
burning light bulb’ (in Shoup 2006). Balfour Beatty, however, noted that Hasankeyf was
abandoned after the First World War and only re-occupied in the 1960s, claiming that at
least some of the history seems imaginary (q. in Shoup 2006).
7 It is not that the Turks have no sense of history: Turkey has sought to salvage the cultural richness in
thousands of important archaeological sites in Anatolia threatened by dam construction; 4–6,500 people in
Belkis village (near Gaziantep) and others in Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Adiyaman Provinces were displaced
to make room for Birecik.
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4.2 Framing the issue
The protest against Ilısu resonated with an ongoing international campaign against large
infrastructural projects and their funders that had gathered steam in the 1990s: Malaysia’s
Pergau Dam, Nepal’s Arun dam, Lesotho’s Highlands Project and indeed Turkey’s Birecik
and Ilısu Dams. Local protest against dams like Arun in Nepal and Narmada was amplified
to a global audience by an INGO lobby, making large donors increasingly uneasy about
funding. In fact when a Swiss consortium won the Ilısu contract in 1996, it found a well-
orchestrated European NGO coalition breathing down its neck.
The Bundesrat, to which the Swiss central bank USB is accountable, justified its export
risk guarantee go ahead for 470 million Swiss francs with a view to new Swiss jobs
(Bosshard 1999). The Swiss government, however, made its export credit conditional on an
independent monitoring mechanism being established.
Casting the GAP flooding and resettlement as a human rights violation and environ-
mental disaster led to parliamentary questions in Germany and Switzerland. The British
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), however, was ‘minded’ to issue a GBP200mn
export credit to the project leader, Turkey’s State Hydraulic Works department (DSI) in
1999. DTI’s Export Credit Guarantee Department, which governs export credits, defended
the project as a fine example of its ethical policy, claiming that it would contribute to
Middle East peace (Guardian 1999).
By recasting the issue as a human rights issue, the opponents could play at a concern
which to many is an absolute, existential value at the individual and group level. The
repression of Kurdish identity was played by the coalition against the Ilısu Dam on a
human as well as cultural rights platform, also drawing on environmental security, the
destruction of the ecosystem.
The opponents’ discourse could be quite heavy-handed. Activist archaeologist Maggie
Ronayne of Trinity College in Galway, Ireland, called the project a weapon of ‘mass
cultural destruction’. George Monbiot, environmental journalist with the British Guardian
newspaper, accused Turkey of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Monbiot 1999) echoed by human rights
organisation Go¨c-Der (Shoup 2006: 250).
While Turkey and the UK foreign office advanced the project as promoting regional
peace, journalists like Monbiot and Fred Pearce claimed that the project would spark a
‘water war’ between the basin states, making frontpage news in The Guardian and The
Independent newspapers in 1999. A water war proved a much more effective discursive
‘spin’ than cultural, ecological or economic security arguments. The affair was painful to
the Labour government which sought to set itself apart from its Conservative predecessor,
which some 4 years before had been embarrassed over dubious dealings on a big dam
project in Malaysia, Pergau.
When questions were raised in the House of Commons, claiming that the Ilısu’s
‘security implications’ could extend far beyond Turkey’s borders and could affect British
security interests as a member of NATO and Turkey’s future in the EU,8 the Blair gov-
ernment decided to wash its hands off the project. Hamilton (2003) argues that the desire
not to upset regional power balances may well have precipitated British withdrawal from
Ilısu.
Activists no doubt hoped that stricter conditions from project backers would mean the
end of the project. Turkey, however, went along with opening up the project to
8 www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000215/halltext/00215h01.htm
(Access 2 April 2012).
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international and local scrutiny and environmental accountability. This move promoted an
already ongoing project redefinition process. While GAP started in the late 1970 with the
intention of reforming the socio-economic situation in the most underdeveloped Turkish
region, the project’s objectives have broadened quite a lot in response to recurring criti-
cism. In 1989, the Turkish government established the South-eastern Anatolia Project
Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA) to plan, monitor, report and coordi-
nate with stakeholders to arrive at regional development (Mukhtarov 2009: 180). Headed
by Olcay U¨nver, many ‘enlightened’ modifications were made, including socio-economic,
environmental, educational and participatory facilities as well a more integrated vision of
water management. Representative reforms included the establishment of Water Users
Associations with farmer representation and decentralisation of decision-making to may-
oral level. The GAP administration prides itself on having turned around from a ‘hydraulic
mission-age’ blueprint to a leading example of participatory Integrated Water Resource
Management, what it calls a ‘human-centred development project’. GAP is now promoted
as a socially responsible, integrated water management project (Kibarog˘lu 2002). In Spring
2000 in response to many criticisms, GAP was reviewed again in a ‘participatory planning
process’, involving groups in such specific fields as rural development plans, social
planning, economic planning, environment and infrastructure’ (GAP-RDA 2002: 22).9
The project in its new incarnation won a Millennium Award from the International
Water Research Association. In this light, donor conditions such as a new Resettlement
Action Plan (RAP) and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as part of the Project
Implementation Plan must have seemed minor. The requested RAP was drawn up by
Turkish consultants following World Bank guidelines. The anti-GAP alliance, however,
enlisted Ays¸e Kudat, a Turkish sociologist who had also worked for the World Bank, to
write a critical report on resettlement (Kudat 2000).
An EIA got to be drafted in 2001 (Ilısu Engineering Group 2001), if with a poor
baseline (Scheumann et al. 2011). In July 2001, the UK Government’s Export Credit
Guarantee Department made the decision whether to provide £160 million backing for the
project contingent on ‘public comment’ on the EIA report. Given the ‘securitised’ status of
the project, this was not without its problems.10 As the EIA did not secure access to credit
guarantees for Ilısu, one foreign partner after the other backed out. Skanska withdrew in
late 2000, just before the World Commission on Dams issued its influential report with
social and environmental guidelines for large dams, which was welcomed by the bilateral
donors (Scheumann 2008). ABB had ceded its involvement to French company Alstom.
Together with Balfour Beatty, Impreglio withdrew in 2001 after their export credit backers
backed out. In 2002, the main financial partner, Swiss UBS Bank, decided to pull out too,
after which funding for the project was as good as dead.
4.3 Ilısu revived
The Turkish government, however, was not letting go of its dam like that and found new
European partners. After several years of standstill and studies for improvement, the Ilısu
Dam project was resurrected in 2005 when a new 14-member consortium including
9 By the administration’s own admission, ‘such concerns and concepts as the environment, sustainability,
and participation… were either overlooked or totally absent in the original’ (GAP-RDA 2002).
10 Among the submissions was that of a prominent lawyer, Vefa, whose submission to the ECGD, ‘Legal
Review of Ilısu (Hasankeyf) Dam and Evacuated Villages’, was reportedly reprinted in a Turkish law paper
and immediately triggered a lawsuit (KHRP et al. 2002).
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German, Swiss and Austrian companies formed. Alstom of Switzerland (formerly part of
ABB) again is involved, along with VA Tech (Austria) and Zu¨blin (Germany), while
Cengiz, Celikler and Lider Nurol are Turkish partners.
In response the Keep Hasankeyf Alive (Hasankeyf’i Yas¸atma Giris¸imi) platform was
formed. The platform consists of NGOs, mayors from the region and professional cham-
bers (see Eberlein et al. 2010 for its composition). In 2006 the Swiss NGO, Berne Dec-
laration (Erkla¨rung von Bern) scored another coup when they got the famous World Bank
sociologist, Michael Cernea, to write a critical assessment of the new Resettlement Action
Plan for Ilısu as updated by DSI in July 2006 and the worrying record of earlier GAP
resettlement just before the restart of construction works (Cernea 2006). While Morvaridi
(2006) has criticised Cernea’s economistic reduction of displaced people to ‘assets’, the
World Bank report was gratefully picked up by the anti-dam coalition.
In addition to local action from protest groups such as the Volunteers of Hasankeyf
Association and the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, the international campaign against
Ilısu has also been revived, again concentrating on the flooding of Hasankeyf. In the first
protests, Friends of the Earth were leading, in the second, a German platform called WEED
(now GegenStro¨mung), which produce a critical weekly Ilısu update, using the case as a
focus for opposition to dams in general.
Such campaigns provide an opportunity for local struggles to find global exposure, for
local NGOs to link up with international ones. They expose themselves, however, to the
risk of capture (hijacking) by the larger interest of the global movement against the global
homogenisation of cultural values and neglect of local identities, the sell-out of natural
resources by states colluding with global hydro-capitalism.
In the context of the NGO struggle against the Flood Action Plan in Bangladesh in the
early 1990s, Kvaloy (1994) wondered whether local protests were stage-managed by
internationally funded national NGOs who themselves previously were not very engaged in
water issues. This charge, however, cannot be levelled so lightly at the anti-dam coalition
in Turkey. While most are not from the region, social and environmental activists find
other stakeholders in their camp who may not agree with all NGO issues, most conspic-
uously to any concessions to Syria and Iraq, but share the (I)NGOs’ dislike of water
privatisation. Turkish professionals such as the Chamber of Geology Engineers (TMMOB),
who are respected voices in domestic political debate (Bayraktar 2007), have increasingly
voiced criticism of the GAP as part of a wider agenda of opposing privatisation, as it places
water in the hands of foreigners.11 The European Court of Human Rights agreed in July
2006 to hear an application against the dam lodged by archaeologists, journalists and
lawyers united in the Hasankeyf Volunteers Association, who feel Hasankeyf must be
preserved in its natural state (Smith-Spark 2006; Kart and O¨zerkan 2006).
The circle of critics has widened since. The official restart of construction works was
greeted by 8,000 protesters including leaders of two political parties. The arts also joined,
as Turkish Nobel Prize for Literature winner Orhan Pamuk protested and popular singer
Tarkan who together with the well-known Turkish environmental group Dog˘a Dernegi
recorded a song in protest of the dam, ‘Uyan’ (wake up). It has become acceptable to
criticise Ilısu, and my conversations with Turkish interviewees (May 2010) suggested that
the dam may eventually be sacrificed.
However, the Minister for the now-merged department of Culture and Tourism, Atilla
Koc, made it clear in 2006 that Hasankeyf would not be saved: ‘Hasankeyf is already gone,
11 See e.g. http://www.polarisinstitute.org/turkeys_government_plans_sweeping_water_privatisation_in_
run_up_to_world_water_forum_in_istanbul accessed 23 March 2012.
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it’s been erased from history’, while DSI General Director Erog˘lu opined: ‘this dam should
have been built 30 years ago’ (quoted by Shoup 2006: 245). The Turkish government took
out a US$1.2 bn loan for the dam.12 Construction began in August 2006.
A Swiss delegation visited the site to verify that Turkey was complying with interna-
tional standards before it would guarantee the US$250mn loan. In March 2007, the three
countries agreed ‘in principle’ but gave Turkey a 90-day deadline for meeting standards.
When this failed to materialise, and after heavy pressure from the NGO coalition, the three
donor countries eventually pulled out in 2009 (Eberlein et al. 2010). The Turkish gov-
ernment nevertheless vowed to move ahead with the dam on its own, with domestically
generated money (Hu¨rriyet 2010), while European contractors stayed on even without
credit guarantee (Guardian, 2009). The NGO coalition, however, refused to budge, tar-
geting Austrian contractor Andritz, who will supply six turbines and generators (Die Presse
2010).
This stand-off belied the palpable rapprochement on both the interstate basin relations
and relations with the Kurdish population in Turkey in the past 10 years, and Turkey has
meanwhile made significant concessions. While Turkey had initially rejected the norms
established by the World Commission on Dams, it started to incorporate them in its dams’
policy (Scheumann 2008). In 2006 the government agreed on conditions and complied
with part of the international conditionalities.
Notably, the strong international response to the ‘water war’ argument is surprising as
2001/2002 was a period of thawing Turkey‘s relations with both the Kurds and down-
stream neighbours. After 1998, the mood among the basin riparians had changed per-
ceptibly towards conciliation or peaceful coexistence. Until 2003, the PKK scaled down
violent hostilities which raised hopes of lifting the state of emergency in the region. A new
government, still in power today, made openings to recognising Kurdish language, culture
and identity. In 2009, the 25th anniversary of anti-GAP violence, Abdullah O¨calan,
returned the favour pronouncing to renounce violence and sought a political role for his
PKK announcing a road map towards peace with Turkey from his prison cell. The ruling
AK-Party has announced its own (heavily criticised) initiatives and claimed that one
should separate PKK terrorism from the Kurdish problem. Recent PKK attacks have soured
the conciliatory mood.
Relations between Syria and Turkey improved dramatically after the extradition of the
PKK leader in 1998, and the conclusion of military and economic agreements was initiated
between Turkey and Syria. In 2001, the GAP and the Syrian development project, GOLD,
signed a cooperation agreement (Kibarog˘lu 2002). In 2002 the two countries shared a
Training and Expertise exercise (Protocol of 2002). After the US President started Syria,
the Turkish and Syrian leaders started paying mutual visits ion 2004 during which Pres-
ident Bashir Assad was assured that Syria could make further use of the Tigris. A free-trade
agreement between the two countries was signed, and the year 2005 saw the establishment
of the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC), a non-governmental ‘Track-
Two’ initiative for closer cooperation on technical, social and economic development
within the river system, headed by ex-GAP-RDA chief U`nver (Dinar 2009) and included a
group of scholars and professionals from Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
While the Ilısu project’s restart on the Tigris in 2006 at first fostered rapprochement
between Syria and Iraq on the Euphrates (Mirkasymov 2006), this was deflected by Tur-
key’s offer to conduct talks with all its water neighbours, if more often on a bilateral rather
than trilateral basis. Turkey announced a joint dam project with Syria on the Orontes/Asi.
12 ‘Turkije leent miljard voor bouw omstreden dam’, Engineering 360o, 15 August 2007.
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The year 2008 apparently saw a remarkable Iraqi volte-face on Ilısu on the river Tigris
(Yavuz 2008) when Iraq’s Water Minister Rashid reportedly told Turkey’s environment
and forestry minister Erog˘lu, former head of DSI, that he would like to see the dam built
‘as fast as possible’ (quoted in Yavuz 2008). In Summer 2009, Turkey and Iraq negotiated
a one-year agreement guaranteeing a bigger quota, but Turkey seems unwilling to commit
to a longer-term river agreement (Wrigley 2009).
For a time, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutog˘lu’s ‘zero-problems’ policy stabilised
relations with the Arab neighbours (Grigoriadis 2010). But this de´tente has not prevented
problems with activist NGOs, who continue to monitor and criticise the GAP.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In spite of the apparent anarchy and the continuing absence of a basin treaty, a kind of
basin regime, in the sense of patterned, predictable state behaviour (Puchala and Hopkins
1983; see also Lopes, this volume), is in place on the Euphrates–Tigris. The public pos-
turing and linkage politics around GAP displays a strongly ritualistic pattern of near-wars
followed by near- or placeholder agreements. While these agreements have fallen short of
an official treaty, this state of affairs created a stability of expectations which can be seen
as an international public good. Indeed, as Kibarog˘lu (2002) shows, throughout the GAP’s
genesis, the states have worked together rather more than NGO material would have to
believe. Technical teams on the Euphrates–Tigris have met on and off despite recurring
political threats of military action, a pragmatic acceptance of the faits accomplis on the part
of the downstream neighbours.
While Zawahri (2008) has cause to doubt whether one can meaningfully speak of
‘cooperation’ when no actor adjusts their water behaviour for mutual benefit, there is a
stability of expectations that justifies the statement that the three countries have maintained
an enduring minimal regime at basin scale, with primacy on the part of Turkey. While this
regime was built on a degree of brinksmanship, things did get solved by high-level
negotiation rather than violence.
Cooperation has been facilitated by geopolitical changes. Since 1998, there has been a
move towards more basin cooperation, and downstreamers seem resigned to the next round
of dam construction. The Syrian government, having exhausted the leverage the Kurdish
card procured them, resigned to Turkish primacy while Iraq is now under direct American
tutelage. This geopolitical change also changed the American perspective: used to sup-
porting the strongest actor in river basins to ensure hegemonic stability, Americans are now
deeply concerned with the future of the downstreamer and promoting basin cooperation
(Zawahri 2006).
The snag is, of course, that while there seems to be a movement from Realist going-it-
alone to forms of cooperation, there is hardly question of equal power relations between
the partners. Turkey’s neighbours feel that they do not have any real say in the regulatory
decisions. They have charged that Turkey is exercising de facto dominance in a context of
de jure equality, so that Turkish regulatory decisions such as the occasional arrest of the
flow to impound reservoirs have been perceived as unilateral and self-serving. Iraq and,
especially, Syria have made repeated, almost ritual threats and used downstream strategies
to counter Turkey’s actions.
Cooperation, however, also presents downstreamers with a strategic dilemma. If
cooperation becomes more structural, Syria and Iraq lose their leeway for making strong
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stances as a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (see Warner and
Zawahri, this issue).
In line with Buzan et al. (1998: 190), we have seen that securitisation can be contagious:
securitised non-water issues may spill over into water security issues. Indeed, due to the
securitised nature of water relations in the basin, non-water issues between the Euphrates–
Tigris riparians also easily became securitised. When the PKK started attacking Turkey’s
hydraulic projects, Southeast Anatolia was placed under martial law.
This begs the question whether desecuritisation in one area can also spread to another. A
change in domestic leadership has brought Turkish rapprochement towards the domestic
Kurdish minority as well as Turkey’s regional neighbours. The current desecuritisation of
water at home and abroad in the Euphrates-basin HSC, however, has been halting—while
there are currently no open hostilities, relations could quickly sour and bring threats and
counterthreats of violence. Turkey remains caught up in a perennial regional ‘insecurity
complex’, a permanent sense of unsafety (Aydın 2003). Being situated in a ‘rough
neighbourhood’ explains Turkey’s eagerness to exercise domestic and external control
(Aydın 2003). While desecuritisation promotes water sharing and integration with
domestic and basin riparians, this is widely resisted across the Turkish spectrum.
The Turkish gains in co-opting Syria, accommodating regime change in Iraq and
political appeasement with the Kurds would at least have appeared to worsen the prospects
for international NGO opposition to Ilısu in 2006. Yet, while basin HSC relations are now
placid under the American aegis, the last lap of GAP proved unsafe from (I)NGO attack.
Despite the domestic and regional thaw, the campaign against the dams assumed its own
dynamics leading to a second retreat from donors and contractors. The first time around,
opponents used strong language (‘water wars’), the second time issues of cultural and
economic insecurity convinced donors to leave, forcing Turkey to forge ahead on its own
pocket.
The analysis suggests that the securitised and desecuritised ‘spheres’ of water politics
influence each other and can be structurally linked or delinked. Spurred by PKK attacks
and international threats, Turkish political leaders have frequently treated GAP as a
national security asset in its struggle with terrorism, deployed army force and denounced
dam opponents as terrorists (a strongly ‘securitised’ discourse) and militarised the
Southeast region (Warner 2005, 2008; Jacoby 2005, though see Watts 2009). However, the
need to generate external funding opened the project to outside influence and scrutiny by
actors from a ‘desecuritised’ sphere. This amplified the resonance of NGO countersecu-
ritisation such that it remains a complicating factor in hydropolitical relations. Keck and
Sikkink’s (1998) ‘boomerang effect’, involving local NGOs mobilising international actors
to pressure their government for reform, thus seems to obtain here: presenting the loss of
cultural heritage and threats to Kurdish identity as life-and-death issues continues to cast
doubts into the minds of donors and guarantors, causing them to pull out.
The protests and criticisms ignored or dismissed the steady outside-in influence of
progressive insight into water development among international water experts seeping
through in the Turkish water world. The cordial links of the GAP-RDA leadership with the
international epistemic community had facilitated the policy transfer of international
emerging Integrated Water Resource Management principles to the GAP, accepting the
multiple values and linkages of water and emphasises participatory decision-making
(Mukhtarov 2009).
This supports a contextual understanding of how projects are influenced by security
speech: while a national (security) crisis can help a project, protest can hurt it when it finds
the funders’ ear. The overlaying non-securitised sphere disarmed local securitisation when
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project funding ran out. Yet, basin detente did not put an end to transnational NGO protest.
Long after basin riparians had toned down their security rhetoric, the symbolism of the
project welded together a coalition of anti-privatisation actors and human and cultural
rights defenders. This almost killed the Ilısu Dam project. Yet, like the proverbial cat, the
dam project may prove to have nine lives.
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